Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada
Kasumigaseki 2-2-1
Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo 100-8919
Japan
Re: Burma Policy Review
Dear Foreign Minister Okada:
We write to you on the occasion of your inauguration as Foreign Minister of Japan to discuss the human rights situation in Burma.
Human rights violations remain rampant all over the world, including in Asia. Across the region, civilians are killed in wars, millions of people are forced to flee violence and persecution as refugees, and many are unlawfully jailed for expressing views critical of their governments. While the past Japanese government made commitments to promote human rights and the rule of law, it was reticent in translating these commitments into concrete and visible actions. Now is the time for Japan to revise its foreign policy and make promotion of human rights a central pillar. Burma is a very good place to start.
As repression continues ahead of the elections planned for 2010, we believe the new Japanese government should urgently undertake a thorough policy review on Burma. As intractable as the situation in Burma may seem, Japan does have a role to play in improving the human rights and political situation there.
As you know, Burma remains one of the most repressive countries in the world. There are strict limits on basic freedoms of expression, association, and assembly. The intelligence and security services are omnipresent. Censorship is draconian. More than 2,200 political prisoners suffer in Burma's squalid prisons. These prisoners include many members of the political opposition, courageous protestors who peacefully took to the streets in August and September 2007, and individuals who criticized the government for its poor response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. All have been sentenced after sham trials, summary hearings that often take place in the prisons themselves. The recent conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi on ridiculous charges reminded the world of the despotic nature of the military government that has been in power since 1962.
At the same time, military abuses connected to armed conflicts in ethnic minority areas continue. Human Rights Watch has for many years documented the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers, the use of forced labor, and summary killings, rape, and other abuses against minority populations, including the Rohingya, Chin, Shan, and Karen. Recent attacks against Shan and Karen communities have once again led to large-scale displacement of ethnic communities and needless death and hardship. Fighting between the Burmese army and ethnic militias has also driven thousands of refugees from northern Shan state into China.
In addition to rampant violations of civil and political rights, corruption and mismanagement have meant that under military rule Burma has become one of the poorest countries in Asia. The government seems to care little for the basic welfare of its people; to give but one example, while the Burmese government received an estimated US$150 million per month in gas export revenue in 2008, its last announced annual budget to address its AIDS crisis in 2007 was a mere $172,000. While most Burmese struggle to subsist, the country's leaders have the comfort of "5 star" lives of luxury generated through corruption from the plunder of the country's natural resources.
There is no mystery in the military's long-term intentions, as the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has been totally open about its plans to stage-manage an electoral process that will ensure continued military rule with a civilian face. Burma's generals have learned from their resounding defeat by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy in 1990 and periodic protest movements that it cannot risk staging a credible election (indeed, last year the government announced a 98 percent turnout and a 92 percent vote in favor of a new constitution, just months after the 2007 street protests that rocked the country). They doubtlessly hope that this will mollify countries that have imposed sanctions and oppose military rule and end the pressure to make progress on political reform and national reconciliation, and encourage large-scale international aid flows.
Based on the experience of the 2008 referendum, the harsh prison sentences handed down to activists, the lack of serious dialogue with the political opposition and Burma's many ethnic groups, the stonewalling of United Nations and ASEAN efforts to discuss political and human rights issues, the lack of any reform measures, and the trial and conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi on ridiculous charges, it is clear that there will be no meaningful change in the political direction of the country before or after the 2010 elections unless concerned governments and international bodies take steps to change the SPDC's calculations.
We recognize the scale of this challenge. The military government has close relations with its neighbors China, India, and Thailand, and has large revenue streams from these countries from the sale of gas, timber, gems, and other natural resources. China, Russia, and even South Africa have protected the government from action at the United Nations Security Council. Japan, thankfully, changed its policy in this respect in 2006, yet still has fallen far short of being a strong public critic of Burma. In short, while much of the world sees Burma's rulers as isolated, ruthless, and despised, from the SPDC's perspective it has influential friends in the region that provide massive resources through the purchase of energy and other commodities, and shield Burma from concerted action at the UN, ASEAN, and other international fora on subjects like effective arms embargoes or targeted sanctions.
According to Keiichi Ono, Director of the First Southeast Asia Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's current policy towards Burma is predicated on "retaining dialogue, providing limited economic assistance, [and] cooperating with the UN and international community." This approach misses an important tool for change: using Japan's international and regional standing and status as one of the world's largest donors to put public pressure on the SPDC.
For years, Japan has been reluctant to exert pressure on the SPDC and its senior leadership. Now is the time to consider a different and stronger approach. With the right calibration and a more unified approach with other states, pressure on Burma can work.
We suggest that Japan's policy review should, therefore, aim at making more effective all three prongs of Japanese policy - diplomacy, sanctions and aid - and not placing one ahead of the others.
Diplomacy
On diplomacy, Human Rights Watch supports Japanese government efforts to speak to the Burmese government at the highest levels. But there should be no wishful thinking or illusions that more conciliatory talk from Japan and others will somehow cause Burma's senior leadership to alter its plans. The Burmese military is committed to remaining in complete control, whether through managed elections or the current system and has exploited engagement by the Japanese government and others by making close contact and relations the primary goal of Japanese policy. The Japanese government should make it clear that as a rights-respecting democracy Japan stands by its principles and the protection of the rights of Burmese and a genuine and credible political reform process needs to be the primary goal of any talks with the Burmese leadership.
Second, Japan should keep in mind that the Burmese officials who normally speak to foreigners - whether the foreign minister or the functionaries involved in the post-Nargis reconstruction - have no real authority in the government and are probably as fearful of Than Shwe and other senior leaders as anyone else. Many foreign diplomats and others who have invested a great deal of time and energy in pursuing relations with the second tier of leadership have told us that it was time largely wasted. Those who do have the authority - Senior General Than Shwe, Vice-Senior General Maung Aye, Lt. General Thura Shwe Mann, Prime Minister Thein Sein, and key regional commanders - usually do not engage with outsiders. Talking to the deputy health minister and mid-level civil servants can be useful in facilitating humanitarian relief and resolving discrete practical problems on the ground. But it is not a way of addressing the fundamental issues in the country or causes of friction between Burma and Japan - including the recent meeting of Htay Oo, minister for agriculture and irrigation and secretary-general of the Union Solidarity and Development Association, with your predecessor Hirofumi Nakasone.
On key political matters, the engagement that has taken place thus far has not been very meaningful and in some cases has even been counterproductive. During the crackdown following the 2007 demonstrations, for instance, diplomatic action merely allowed the SPDC to buy time and pretend that it was engaged in serious discussions. For example, the efforts of the UN secretary-general's special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, have failed to achieve anything of substance. The situation has devolved to the point that at times getting a visa or a short meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi was treated as a success, with the unintended but predictable consequence of being used by the SPDC for its own propaganda. Ban Ki-Moon's most recent visit also failed to achieve anything of substance; he was not even allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and was given empty promises to release political prisoners.
Human Rights Watch recommends that Japan appoint its own special envoy. That envoy should have a direct line to the foreign minister and specific instructions to engage in a principled way with the SPDC and other key bilateral and multilateral actors. Vigorous and principled diplomacy is needed with China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other influential actors, to ensure that new revenue streams are not made available to the government.
We also encourage you to consider the establishment of a Burma Contact Group or some form of multilateral grouping, in close contact with the US, to meet and regularly discuss diplomatic engagement with the Burmese government on a range of issues. This could have the effect of converging the views and policies of China, India, Thailand, Indonesia and others, and gradually minimize the ability of the SPDC to play states off against each other. There is considerable common ground on a range of issues, including the need for political reform and credible elections involving the political opposition, concern over Burma's trafficking in heroin and methamphetamines, and the need for a regional approach to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Another topic could be the growing defense links between Burma and North Korea, as evidenced by the recent publication of photos showing North Korean assistance building tunnel complexes in Burma. Such a Contact Grouping would, of course, have to be predicated on Japan sticking to human rights principles and not engaging in diplomatic horse-trading on core issues of reform.
As the United Nations has long been the focal point for diplomacy on Burma, we urge Japan to keep supporting the continuation of a special envoy of the secretary-general. It is crucial that the secretary-general and the special envoy not get sucked into the game of access or high-level meetings being the goal or a sign of progress. The envoy must be an individual with the principles, skills, and backing of the international community to make an impact.
Sanctions
There is now a strong and even emotional debate on sanctions against Burma. Some argue that sanctions have not had any discernible impact on the military government and should be lifted. Others argue that for political and technical reasons they have never been properly implemented and, therefore, more pressure should be applied by imposing sanctions on additional companies and individuals, and also by encouraging countries and institutions that have not imposed sanctions to do so.
Part of the problem is that this debate tends to treat all sanctions as the same, when in fact they should be differentiated. In our work in various countries around the globe, we have found that properly imposed targeted sanctions can be effective in bringing about improvements in human rights. Targeted sanctions include arms embargoes and restrictions on military assistance, travel bans on individuals, financial sanctions on individuals and entities, and investment and trade sanctions that are specifically focused on companies or economic sectors of greatest concern.
Perhaps the most effective of these are financial sanctions. As with countries like the US, EU, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada, which already have financial sanctions in place, we urge Japan to impose financial sanctions as part of a coordinated approach to put maximum pressure on Burma's leaders. Human Rights Watch supports sanctions, including financial sanctions, targeted at leading officials, both military and civilian, who bear responsibility for abuses. Targeted sanctions don't impose hardship on ordinary people, but do provide leverage if effectively implemented. Going after financial transactions by key individuals in the SPDC and others with close ties to the oil and gas authority and other key revenue-generating entities in Burma will require the dedication of intelligence resources and continual monitoring and adjustment by Japan, as it does by the US and other governments which have imposed financial sanctions. These individuals are at the apex of the system inside Burma and susceptible to this kind of coordinated pressure.
Human Rights Watch also believes Japan, as a leading proponent of human security at the UN Security Council, should pursue openings for targeted military sanctions through the UN Security Council's agenda on children and armed conflict. The Security Council has stated in two resolutions (SC Res. 1539 and Res. 1612) that it will consider bans on the export and supply of small arms, light weapons, and other military equipment and assistance to parties that refuse to end their recruitment and use of child soldiers. The Burmese military retains thousands of children in its ranks and has been identified repeatedly since 2002 by the UN secretary-general for its continued recruitment and use of child soldiers. While the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council against Burma has proven nearly impossible, the children and armed conflict agenda provides a useful avenue for stronger Security Council action. A credible threat of military sanctions can be used as leverage to gain concrete improvements in ending the widespread recruitment and use of children as soldiers.
Humanitarian and Development Aid
On humanitarian aid, Human Rights Watch has long called for increased assistance to deal with acute humanitarian needs in Burma. Japan funding can increase on certain conditions outlined below. But first, it is necessary to recognize that the cause of Burma's humanitarian problems is not a lack of available resources. Burma has made gas deals with Thailand that provides the government its largest source of revenue, worth approximately $2 billion annually. A new deal to supply natural gas to China via an overland pipeline will significantly add to that sum. Burma's leaders also count on large earnings from sales of gems and timber, and ongoing hydroelectric projects are expected to generate additional lucrative export revenue.
Despite these large revenue sources, the military government spends next to nothing on the welfare of its people. The largest share of the state budget is allocated to the military, as much as 40 percent, while combined social spending is estimated to be a paltry 0.8 percent of GDP for 2008/09, making public expenditures on health and education in Burma among the lowest in the world. Huge numbers of Burmese live in grinding poverty, brought upon by decades of government economic mismanagement and corruption. For this reason, the suggestion that foreign business investment in Burma would somehow open up the country is fallacious. Foreign investment in Burma is concentrated on the extraction of natural resources and building of hydropower projects. The resulting revenues are largely squandered, stolen, or used for military spending instead of to meet humanitarian and development needs, thereby resulting in the strengthening of those in power and robbing the Burmese people of basic economic and social rights.
Donor discussions with the SPDC over the provision of humanitarian assistance should not neglect the government's ability to contribute substantially to such assistance. Donors should also remember that the purpose of humanitarian aid is humanitarian - to keep people alive and healthy - not political. No one should expect humanitarian aid itself to have a significant political effect in opening up the country or changing the government's policies. Donors will also need to stress the importance of transparency and accountability in the delivery of humanitarian aid, including the need for approaches that strengthen civil society rather than existing corrupt power structures and that respond to the views and needs of ordinary people.
The SPDC does not want to be totally dependent on China. For this reason, it also wants assistance from Japan, the US, and EU. Development aid is a very important incentive for change in Burma. However, we do not believe development aid from Japan or other countries should be made available until there is significant political reform, progress on human rights, better governance, and the possibility of consulting civil society and local communities in setting development goals. Likewise, World Bank lending for development should also not be resumed until these conditions are met. Unfortunately, the SPDC gives priority to development initiatives that are "vanity projects" for its leaders, facilitate abusive military campaigns, and help generate funds to strengthen military rule, when what is needed is development that would alleviate the poverty and deprivation of ordinary citizens.
Helping the Burmese people is one of the most difficult and intractable problems the world has faced in recent decades. We don't underestimate the challenge, but we think a new and principled approach by the international community with Japanese leadership can make a significant difference in the years ahead.
Sincerely,
Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
In Myanmar's Chin state as well as some surrounding areas, a heavy infiltration of rats is devastating crops. This man is trying to protect his field by beating the rats with a stick.
Images of refugees in deplorable living conditions, poignant facial expressions, distraught children form the gist of the work of five international photojournalists who documented the lives of Burmese refugees in Malaysia.
“In the report, refugees who are now residing in the US, and who once lived in Malaysia, were interviewed and they have one thing in common. All of them have been sold,” he told a crowd of 60 people.
However, Santiago (right) credited the government for taking some action to arrest traffickers in the last couple of months.
The audience were also treated to a performance by two Burmese musicians.
Suaram is expecting to collect at least 10,000 signatures from Malaysians by May 21, 2010 to be submitted to Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak.
Refugees, adults and children alike, are instead treated as ‘illegal immigrants’ and are subjected to harsh penalties, detention and deportation under the Immigration Act.
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